

SECRET

25X1A9a

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Washington 25, D.C.

ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File

6 February 1951

TAB "A"

ARMY CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA**II. HOW STRONG AND HOW STABLE IS TITO'S REGIME AT PRESENT****D. Military Vulnerabilities to Soviet-Satellite Attacks****1. Geographic Position**

a. Yugoslavia is bordered by four hostile, Soviet Satellite countries (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania), although she also has common frontiers with three pro-Western countries (Greece, Italy, and the British Zone of Austria). While Yugoslavia has an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea through the Adriatic Sea, this sea route is geographically vulnerable to Satellite attacks from Albanian ports. Albania controls the eastern shores of the narrow Straits of Otranto, which is the exit from the Adriatic to the Mediterranean.

b. Yugoslavia is, for the most part, a mountainous country, favorable to defensive and guerrilla military operations. in the Danubian Plain and the area north of the Sava River. However, the terrain is flat or rolling and there are no significant terrain barriers to movement from Hungary and Rumania.

c. The frontier areas between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and between Yugoslavia and Albania, are very mountainous. Historically, large-scale military movements from Bulgaria into Yugoslavia have been restricted to the following routes:

- (1) Vidin - Negotin - Pozarevac.
- (2) Kula - Zajecar - Paracin
- (3) Sofia - Nis

SECRET

Review of this document by CIA has determined that
☒ CIA has no objection to declass
☐ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S
Authority: HR 78-2
☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest
Date 24 Feb 81 Reviewer 6514

FEB 7 1951
NE-2

SECRET

(4) Kyustendil - Kumanovo

(5) Petrich - Strumica

The three first named routes lead into the Morava River Valley which provides a route of easy approach to Belgrade from the south and east.

d. Access to Yugoslavia from Albania for large military forces is restricted to the following routes, none of which are particularly good:

(1) Shkoder - Titograd

(2) Kukes - Prizren

(3) Along the western side of Lake Ohrid

(4) Korca - Resan

e. Several large areas of Yugoslavia are particularly vulnerable to attacks from the neighboring Satellite countries:

(1) Northwestern Yugoslavia, including Slovenia and northern Croatia, are vulnerable to invasion from Hungary. This area could be rapidly cut off from the remainder of the country by a military drive southward through Zagreb towards Fiume. The area north of the Sava River between Zagreb and the Danube River can be easily invaded at a number of points along the Hungarian frontier.

(2) The Danubian Plain north of Belgrade is especially vulnerable to armored attacks from either Hungary or Rumania. Although Belgrade and its environs are partially protected on the north by the Danube River, it is not easily defended against forces moving across the Danubian Plain or north through the Morava River Valley from Bulgaria.

f. Yugoslav Macedonia and lines of communication connecting it with the rest of the country are vulnerable to being cut off by attacks toward Skoplje from Bulgaria and Albania.

2
SECRET

SECRET

g. Thus, most of the peripheral areas along Yugoslavia's extended frontier are highly vulnerable to Satellite invasion. Only one large mountainous area (including Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Montenegro) is suitable in which to organize and maintain a strong defense. The terrain of the area would favor the defending forces considerably although several fair Adriatic Sea ports would provide the only access to the area for supplies coming from outside the country. Ideal as the area is for a prolonged defensive, it would be initially vulnerable to enemy penetrations from the directions of Zagreb and Fiume, providing that such penetrations were made before the Yugoslavs could organize defensive positions. Also, there are several points along the Dalmation coast where limited Soviet amphibious operations, launched from Albanian bases, are feasible.

2. Logistical Weaknesses

a. Yugoslav capacity for manufacturing munitions is small. Limited quantities of small arms and ammunition, mortars, grenades, mines, aerial bombs, artillery ammunition, and some light artillery are produced. Limited facilities are available to make tank and artillery components and to repair or modify armaments obtained from foreign sources. Yugoslav munitions production could not meet the Armed Forces' needs in time of war, excepting those for light infantry weapons and small-arms ammunition.

b. The greatest part of the Yugoslav munitions production is centered around Belgrade. Since this area would be vulnerable not only to ground attacks early in an invasion from the East, but also to air attack commencing with D-day, it is likely that these production facilities might be quickly lost to the Yugoslavs.

c. Regarding the supply of war materiel from outside sources, the main ports of entry or transportation lines from these ports are highly vulnerable to invasion. Railroads and motor roads from Trieste and the port of Fiume are likely to be cut off by military action early in an attack from Hungary. Road and rail lines leading from Salonika, Greece are vulnerable

SECRET

SECRET

to ground attack from Bulgaria and Albania. The only ports, roads, and rail lines likely to remain in operation in wartime for an extended period are those along the Dalmation coast and those leading inland from the coast. Even these are mediocre and vulnerable to early air attacks.

III. WHAT POLITICAL ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND SUBVERSIVE PRESSURES ARE THE U.S.S.R. AND SATELLITES LIKELY TO APPLY AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA DURING 1951, AND WITH WHAT SUCCESS

A. Military Pressures

1. Troop Movements and Frontier Incidents

a. The recurring concentrations and movements of Satellite troops along the Yugoslav frontier will probably continue to cause uneasiness in Yugoslavia, and might cause the Yugoslavs prematurely to mal-deploy Army units prior to an actual invasion.

b. Troop movements, frontier incidents, and an increase in the number of Soviet units in the Balkans can continue with the aim of: (1) Creating unrest; (2) lowering Yugoslav morale; and (3) possibly, as tactical diversions, enabling agents and guerrilla bands to move into Yugoslavia.

c. It is not believed that the above military measures in themselves will be particularly effective against the Tito regime.

2. Guerrilla Operations - The Soviets can organize guerrilla bands in areas adjacent to Yugoslavia for the purpose of: (1) Disrupting the Yugoslav economy to the maximum; (2) attempting the assassination of pro-Tito Communist leaders; (3) conducting espionage; and (4) creating general unrest. Most of the personnel for such guerrilla groups would have to be recruited from Communists within the Satellite countries, although some could be drawn from anti-Tito Yugoslav Communists both outside and inside Yugoslavia. The capabilities of such guerrillas to gain any success would be seriously restricted by the effectiveness of the Yugoslav Army and Yugoslavia's strong security forces. There probably would be a lack of sympathy on the part of the Yugoslav people for such terrorists.

SECRET

SECRET

IV. CAN THE U.S.S.R. AND HER EUROPEAN SATELLITES DESTROY THE TITO REGIME BY INVASION DURING 1951?

A. What are the Soviet Capabilities for Destroying the Tito Regime By Invading Yugoslavia?

1. The Soviet Armed Forces have the capability successfully to invade Yugoslavia, overcome organized resistance and eventually bring Yugoslav guerrilla opposition under control.

2. Soviet forces presently disposed in countries adjacent to Yugoslavia consist of six line division - two each in Austria, Hungary, and Rumania. These forces are insufficient to invade Yugoslavia and accomplish the stated objectives.

3. The additional forces required for an attack could be drawn from the U.S.S.R. There are an estimated 73 line divisions in the Western U.S.S.R., 28 of which are estimated to be in the southwestern military districts adjacent to the Balkan area. An adequate force would be made available from the foregoing 28 line divisions.

4. The Soviet forces probably could destroy organized Yugoslav resistance within one month. The period of time required to bring Yugoslav guerrilla resistance under control would probably be considerably longer and would depend on the extent of outside aid to the guerrillas and the scale of the Soviet effort. This effort, in turn, would be dependent on the urgency with which the Soviets viewed the elimination of the resistance. Another consideration governing the scale of the final effort would be whatever military operations might be planned to follow the invasion of Yugoslavia or which might result therefrom.

B. What are the Capabilities of Satellite Armed Forces for Destroying the Tito Regime by Invasion, Without Direct Participation by the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.?

SECRET

SECRET

1. What total military forces can the Eastern European Satellites probably bring to bear against Yugoslavia in 1951?

a. The four Armies of Albania, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria currently possess a total strength of approximately 440,000 men, 34 line divisions (28 infantry, 3 mechanized, and 3 armored), 13 combat brigades (including armored, infantry, cavalry, and artillery), plus a number of independent regiments.*

b. Assuming a partial mobilization commencing at least 30 days prior to D-day, these four Satellites could attack Yugoslavia with a total force of 925,000 men, 47 line divisions (39 infantry, 3 mechanized, and 5 armored), 11 combat brigades, plus supporting independent regiments.* Not all of the equipment for such a force is now available, but additional Soviet contributions of equipment could provide the necessary amounts by the end of April 1951.

c. Currently, the equipment status of these four Armies is good to excellent in terms of quality. Soviet heavy weapons, such as heavy and medium tanks, self-propelled guns, medium artillery, and rocket launchers have been identified in the possession of one or more of these countries in either large quantities or in quantities sufficient to indicate that they probably are becoming standard equipment. Also, while the currently expanding Hungarian Army and, possibly, the Rumanian Army are probably not up to their Tables of Equipment requirements for heavy weapons, Soviet units and supply depots in those countries could turn over such equipment to the foregoing two armies fairly rapidly.

2. What are the fighting capabilities of the Satellite Armed Forces that could be brought to bear against Yugoslavia in 1951?

a. Of the four Satellite Armies which would be used against Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian Army is now the best-trained and -equipped, and

SECRET

SECRET

probably the best led. Bulgarian units could be expected to give a good account of themselves against Yugoslav units. While not so well trained as the Bulgarians, the Rumanian Army has placed increased emphasis on training during the last year and is probably now capable of carrying out fairly effective combat operations. Both the discipline and political indoctrination of Rumanian troops also have received considerable attention, with Soviet military advisers directly participating in this effort.

b. Although the Hungarian Army did not begin to reorganize and expand until the latter half of 1950, its training activities during that period and the first month of 1951 have been considerable. However, Hungarian troops are not yet believed to be adequately trained for effective combat operations against Yugoslav units. Intensive training for another two months, including refresher training of a large number of reservists, would be necessary before the Hungarian Army can field reasonably effective ground forces.

c. Although information on the present status of training and equipment in the Albanian Army is meagre it is known that some types of Soviet heavy weapons have been given to units in addition to the light weapons which they already possess. Also, several reports that additional Soviet advisers have recently arrived indicate that an effort is being made to increase the capabilities of the Albanian Army.

d. In general, the fighting qualities of the four Satellites' troops would be at least good, relative to Yugoslav troops, particularly if the Satellites were carrying out successful offensive operations without serious setbacks. Continuing political indoctrination efforts, strict discipline, and extensive training probably have eliminated the possibility of large-scale defections and desertions, particularly in a local conflict against Yugoslavia. While the politically apathetic Satellite conscript soldier will not be a fanatical fighter, he will, under the control and direction of Communist-indoctrinated officers and noncommissioned officers, be aggressively in the attack. On the defensive, however, it is likely that the effectiveness of these troops would decline sharply.

SECRET

f. It can be concluded, therefore, that any of the four Satellite Ground Forces used against Yugoslavia, will be reasonably well-trained and -equipped. While the Hungarian and Albanian forces may still be inferior to the Yugoslavs in 1951, on a unit-per-unit basis, the Bulgarian and Rumanian units, because of their superiority in types and quantity of materiel, will be at least equal in over-all combat effectiveness and they probably will be superior in the types and quantities of weapons. These Satellite Armies would undoubtedly receive extensive and timely Soviet logistical support, a major advantage.

C. What are Yugoslav Military Capabilities for Resisting Invasion:

1. What is the strength and combat efficiency of the Yugoslav Armed Forces:

a. Currently, the Yugoslav Army has a personnel strength of 275,000 men, and a unit strength of 31 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, and a number of independent regiments. In addition to these Army forces, there are 45,000 men, 4 divisions, and 3 regiments in the KNOJ (security troops), and 40,000 in the Militia.

b. The Yugoslav Army can be expanded to a total of 475,000 men and 33 divisions by M/15 days, and to 600,000 men and 40 divisions by M/30 days. Although the manpower and mobilization machinery are adequate for a further expansion to 1,000,000 men by M/180 days, current and future stocks of weapons could provide additional units only with light infantry weapons and some field artillery.

c. The training of Yugoslav Army troops has been generally good, particularly small unit infantry training. The extent of training directly related to defensive operations against Soviet or Satellite forces is unknown. However, two divisional field exercises held in 1950 were apparently so related. Considerable training of reservists occurred in 1950, more than in previous years. This would tend to increase the capabilities of mobilized Yugoslav forces.

SECRET

SECRET

d. Yugoslav Army weapons are generally of good quality, but heterogenous; Soviet and German World War II models predominating. Quantities are adequate to bring at least existing divisions up to T/O strength in most categories, with a surplus of small arms. Some ammunition stocks are believed to be sufficient for several months of war. Yugoslav combat effectiveness would rapidly deteriorate after D-day due to inability to obtain materiel to replace that lost in combat. Yugoslav combat units appear to be short of crew-served antitank weapons (including self-propelled guns), tanks, and antiaircraft artillery, their most outstanding equipment weaknesses.

e. Yugoslav troops are capable of good combat performance. Many of the officers and noncommissioned officers of the permanent cadre and the reserves had combat experience with Tito's Partisans during World War II, and have had at least fairly good training since then. The relative combat efficiency of Yugoslav troops, however, will depend to a large extent upon where and how they are used.

f. If large Yugoslav forces are committed to defending northern Croatia, the Danubian Plain and the border area adjacent to Bulgaria, they will be extremely vulnerable to the Satellites' superiority in armored and mechanized units.

g. If, on the other hand, the bulk of the Yugoslav Army is initially committed to a defense of the mountainous area including Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Montenegro, Yugoslav units would be much more effective defensive operations. Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav General Staff are aware of the dangers involved in attempting a strong defense of the northern plains areas, but, as yet, the dispositions of Yugoslav Army units do not indicate that Yugoslav military leaders have made such a decision.

2. How are the capabilities of the Yugoslav Armed Forces likely to develop during 1951: How far is such development dependent on assistance from the West:

SECRET

SECRET

a. Very little improvement can be expected in the capabilities of the Yugoslav Army during 1951. The Yugoslavs are attempting to obtain materiel from foreign sources to replenish and supplement their existing stocks of tanks, antiaircraft guns, field artillery, and other materiel. Some materiel, such as light artillery and small arms are manufactured in Yugoslav plants. However, production is slow, and it will be some time before new items of equipment can be produced in significant quantities.

b. Continued emphasis on training of both personnel on active duty and reservists will slightly increase their potential combat effectiveness in 1951.

c. The Yugoslav Army's combat capabilities would be considerably increased if were to receive sufficient quantities of certain items of war materiel, such as anti-tank weapons, self-propelled guns, rocket launches and ammunition for these weapons. Such materiel must come from non-orbit sources, but would have no major effect upon combat capabilities until Yugoslav personnel could be trained in the use of any new weapons received.

3. Can the Yugoslav Armed Forces successfully oppose an invasion?

a. The Yugoslav Armed Forces are not now capable of successfully opposing an invasion by a combination of the four Satellite Armies (Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania), or an invasion by Soviet forces.

b. Against an invasion by Soviet forces, the organized resistance of the Yugoslav Armed Forces could be expected to continue for a maximum of about one month if the defense was concentrated in the mountainous area of Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Montenegro. If not, resistance by regular military forces would probably end within two weeks.

SECRET

SECRET

c. Against the four Satellite Armies, the organized resistance of the Yugoslav Armed Forces could be expected to continue for about three months, but probably no more than four months under the most favorable defensive conditions.

d. Guerrilla-type resistance probably would continue beyond the time of the collapse of organized resistance. Such guerrilla resistance would be restricted to isolated, mountainous areas and its duration would be dependent upon the number of troops which the Soviets or Satellites used for operations against the Yugoslav guerrilla forces, and how extensive the guerrilla resistance proved to be.

4. To what extent would military aid from the West be a critical factor in Yugoslav resistance:

a. Western military assistance, in the form of weapons and equipment which could be readily integrated into Yugoslav units, would considerably strengthen Yugoslav capabilities to resist an invasion. There would be a period of at least a month, however, from the time of arrival, before any such equipment would begin to improve Yugoslav capabilities. Any Western military assistance would have to commence several months before a Soviet Bloc invasion, if it was to be a major factor in the Yugoslav defensive capabilities. If such assistance did commence several months before an invasion, it could considerably lengthen the period of resistance to a Soviet invasion, at the same time it would make such an invasion more costly, and could increase Yugoslav defensive capabilities to the point where they would be able to effectively defend successfully against a Satellite invasion.

SECRET

V. IS DIRECT MILITARY ATTACK UPON YUGOSLAVIA BY THE U.S.S.R. OR BY ITS SATELLITES LIKELY DURING 1951?

A. What are the Indications for and Against the Likelihood of Such an Attack?

1. Indications of Soviet Attack - Recent Soviet military activity in the areas peripheral to Yugoslavia does not indicate preparations for imminent hostilities. Movement of Soviet troops into the area to assemble a force capable of invading Yugoslavia has not been noted. Preparations for an attack this year will not necessarily be evident until an invasion is imminent. Thus, the present absence of Soviet military activity cannot be construed as an indication that Soviet forces will not attack Yugoslavia this year.

2. Indications of Satellite Attack

a. During the last two years, and particularly during 1950, there have been notable improvements in the status of training and supply as well as increases in personnel in most of the Eastern European Satellite Armies. Such developments have been especially marked in the Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Hungarian Armies, and there are some indications that considerable improvements are taking place in Albania also. Some of the aspects of this Satellite military build-up are listed below as separate indications. The general military build-up of the Balkan Satellites, however, is an indication, in itself, that the Soviets intend eventually to use these Armies in a combat role. The present status of the Hungarian Army indicates that it will not be used in a Soviet-initiated campaign during 1951. Even in this case, however, a sudden acceleration of the current rate of improvement could ready Hungarian Ground Forces for combat in about two months. This Satellite military build-up represents a growing threat to Yugoslavia, and also it could be construed as preparations for a general war or for an attack on Greece and/or Turkey.

SECRET

SECRET

b. The continuing shipments of heavy and medium tanks, self-propelled guns, medium artillery, trucks, and other equipment is a part of the general military build-up in the area. The large quantities and the types involved, however, have been significant enough to warrant separate mention.

c. The bulk of these shipments during the last three years were apparently made in 1950. This, by itself, indicates the possibility that Soviet leaders intend to use Satellite units in the near future and are taking steps properly to equip them for whatever mission is assigned to them.

d. The number of Soviet Bloc merchant ships unloading cargoes at Albanian ports each month quadrupled during the summer and Autumn of 1950. At least a part of this increase in shipping presumably is made up of war materiel for strengthening Albania's military forces.

e. There is firm evidence that considerable refresher training of reservists has been going on in Bulgaria since the summer of 1950, and that similar training is commencing in Hungary.

f. While strength increases have occurred in Bulgaria and Hungary during the regular autumn call-ups, there are a number of indications from various sources that conscripts and reservists were being called up for extended active duty during the winter, in those two countries and in Rumania. Gradual strength increases may still be taking place in those countries.

g. Very little unit training had previously occurred during the winter, except in Bulgaria during 1949-1950. This year, however, both the Bulgarian and Hungarian Armies are conducting unit training and field exercises.

h. Up to 22 January 1951, Western diplomatic officials stationed in Budapest, Hungary, traveled relatively freely throughout the country. As of 22 January, however, their travel was limited to the Budapest area only, unless official trip permits were obtained. To date requests for such permits have been refused.

SECRET

SECRET**B. Reasons For and Against Attack**

1. Reasons For - The Soviets might be impelled to decide to attack Yugoslavia during 1951 by one or a combination of the following considerations:

a. The Soviets may believe that Yugoslav capabilities to resist attack are at a low point because of economic difficulties and a resulting deterioration not only of national morale, but also of the regime's strength. The Soviets may conclude that, by 1952, Yugoslav capabilities might be substantially increased.

b. The Soviets may estimate that the present military weakness and presumed disunity of the Western Powers would preclude prompt and effective Western assistance to Yugoslavia and, also give reasonable assurance that the fighting would be localized.

c. The Soviet probably view Yugoslavia's present independence as favorable to the development of a base for Western operations constituting an intolerable threat against the Soviet flank and rear in event of a general war in Western Europe. Hence, if the Soviets intend to initiate hostilities or to take other actions which would likely precipitate a general war in the near future, they might well move first to eliminate such a prospective threat.

d. Conceivably, the Soviets might decide that the effect of Yugoslavia's independence on the loyalty of the Satellite Governments and on the development of Tito-type Communist parties outside the orbit could not be tolerated for another year. This consideration insofar as it can be determined does not appear to be a compelling factor.

2. Reasons Against - The following factors might argue against an attack on Yugoslavia during 1951:

a. The Soviets probably expect that their military program for the Satellites will bring the Armed Forces to a considerable higher state of preparedness for an attack on Yugoslavia in 1952 than can be achieved this year.

SECRET

SECRET

b. The Soviets may consider that an attack on Yugoslavia would have an unfavorable effect on accomplishment of Soviet objectives elsewhere, in view of the probable reaction of the NATO Powers. While Western assistance to Yugoslavia might not be timely and adequate and while the Soviets might discount the risk of global war growing out of the action, the attack probably would give additional impetus to moves already underway toward unified defense of Western Europe. Soviet reaction to West German rearmament, NATO developments, and U.S. military preparations indicates serious concern over the effect of these moves on Soviet objectives in Europe.

c. The Soviets may consider that bringing Yugoslavia back into the orbit by armed force is undesirable because it would confirm the original Yugoslav charges concerning the nature and objectives of Soviet Communism.

d. The Soviets may believe that a direct attack on Yugoslavia would be difficult to justify propaganda-wise. Communist propaganda has defined aggression as "any act committed by a state in using armed force against another state under any pretext whatever." This definition was tailored to fit the current pattern of Communist aggression, but it can, of course, be readily adjusted or scrapped.

e. The Soviets may well believe that they can more than offset any increase in Yugoslav defensive capabilities during this year by concurrent improvements of Satellite offensive capabilities, thus achieving a more favorable position for attack in 1952. The Soviets probably believe that a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia could be staged in 1951 without serious risk of Soviet involvement in general war, but they also may believe that their present efforts will keep Yugoslavia in her present relative isolation. They also may believe that they have a reasonable chance of preventing the Western Powers from achieving either the capability or the unity necessary to challenge the Soviets or to render effective aid to Tito in 1952.

SECRET

SECRET

f. The Soviets might well attack Yugoslavia during 1951 if they intend to take other actions in the near future which are likely to result in general war, since they would feel impelled to eliminate the potential flanking threat inherent in Yugoslavia's independence. If this is not the Soviet intention, the Soviets might estimate that the Satellite's capabilities can be readily increased during 1951, while the external factors arguing against Western intervention or effective assistance will remain essentially the same as they are today.

C. Choice of Attacking Force

1. Soviet forces have the capability of invading Yugoslavia and destroying the Tito regime. Consequently, Satellite forces, supported by adequate, direct and overt Soviet aid, likewise can achieve the stated objective. Present Satellite forces can be augmented sufficiently to make the attack the spring if they receive the necessary Soviet logistical support before and during the attack. Considerable augmentation and support is already underway and can be expected to continue.

2. Present military activity in the area peripheral to Yugoslavia indicates a concentration on improving the offensive capabilities of the Satellite forces rather than those of the Soviet forces on the spot. These developments suggest that, if an attack is made this spring, Satellite forces would be used. Political considerations also argue strongly for the use of Satellite forces, without direct or overt Soviet participation, but with adequate Soviet logistical support, since the Satellites could be much more readily represented as threatened by Yugoslav aggression, which presumably would be the propaganda basis for an attack on Yugoslavia. Selection of the Satellites as the attacking force would also be consistent with the apparent Soviet pattern of avoiding the involvement of Soviet forces.

3. If the Satellite attack should fail, however and, particularly, if Yugoslav counteraction should extend into the Satellite territories, the Soviets might intervene, but only after an examination of the local and global factors and the consequences which would follow.

SECRET

D. Probability of Attack in 1951

1. Examination of possible reasons for or against an attack in 1951 indicates that the Soviets need not feel compelled to make the attack in 1951, unless their broader plans envisage actions which would involve the probability of general war in the near future. An attack on Yugoslavia would have the primary purpose of eliminating a potential flanking threat and of increasing Soviet offensive capabilities against Western Europe.

2. Examination of present military activities in the area peripheral to Yugoslavia indicates primarily that a general build-up of Satellite military force is underway. If a partial mobilization is made, the Satellite forces can be brought to the state of preparedness required to attack Yugoslavia this spring. There are no conclusive indications, however, that such a mobilization is being undertaken.

3. Neither possible motivations nor presently available indications enable an assessment of the probability of attack in 1951. However, since a successful Satellite attack could be initiated, there exists a strong possibility of such an attack in 1951.

SECRET